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Statistics, Causality and Bell’s Theorem
Richard D. Gill
Abstract. Bell’s [Physics 1 (1964) 195–200] theorem is popularly sup-
posed to establish the nonlocality of quantum physics. Violation of
Bell’s inequality in experiments such as that of Aspect, Dalibard and
Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 49 (1982) 1804–1807] provides empirical proof
of nonlocality in the real world. This paper reviews recent work on
Bell’s theorem, linking it to issues in causality as understood by statis-
ticians. The paper starts with a proof of a strong, finite sample, version
of Bell’s inequality and thereby also of Bell’s theorem, which states that
quantum theory is incompatible with the conjunction of three formerly
uncontroversial physical principles, here referred to as locality, realism
and freedom.
Locality is the principle that the direction of causality matches the
direction of time, and that causal influences need time to propagate
spatially. Realism and freedom are directly connected to statistical
thinking on causality: they relate to counterfactual reasoning, and to
randomisation, respectively. Experimental loopholes in state-of-the-art
Bell type experiments are related to statistical issues of post-selection
in observational studies, and the missing at random assumption. They
can be avoided by properly matching the statistical analysis to the ac-
tual experimental design, instead of by making untestable assumptions
of independence between observed and unobserved variables. Method-
ological and statistical issues in the design of quantum Randi challenges
(QRC) are discussed.
The paper argues that Bell’s theorem (and its experimental confir-
mation) should lead us to relinquish not locality, but realism.
Key words and phrases: Counterfactuals, Bell inequality, CHSH in-
equality, Tsirelson inequality, Bell’s theorem, Bell experiment, Bell test
loophole, nonlocality, local hidden variables, quantum Randi challenge.
1. INTRODUCTION
Bell’s (1964) theorem states that certain predic-
tions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with
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the conjunction of three fundamental principles of
classical physics which are sometimes given the short
names “realism”, “locality” and “freedom”. Corre-
sponding real world experiments, Bell experiments,
are supposed to demonstrate that this incompati-
bility is a property not just of the theory of quan-
tum mechanics, but also of nature itself. The conse-
quence is that we are forced to reject at least one of
these three principles.
Both theorem and experiment hinge around an
inequality constraining probability distributions of
outcomes of measurements on spatially separated
physical systems; an inequality which must hold if
all three fundamental principles are true. In a nut-
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shell, the inequality is an empirically verifiable con-
sequence of the idea that the outcome of one mea-
surement on one system cannot depend on which
measurement is performed on the other. This idea,
called locality or, more precisely, relativistic local
causality, is just one of the three principles. Its
formulation refers to outcomes of measurements
which are not actually performed, so we have to
assume their existence, alongside of the outcomes
of those actually performed: the principle of real-
ism, or more precisely, counterfactual definiteness.
Finally, we need to assume that we have complete
freedom to choose which of several measurements to
perform—this is the third principle, also called the
no-conspiracy principle or no super-determinism.
(As we shall see, super-determinism is a conspira-
torial form of determinism.)
We shall implement the freedom assumption as
the assumption of statistical independence between
the randomisation in a randomised experimental de-
sign, and the set of outcomes of each experimen-
tal unit under all possible treatments. This set con-
sists of the “counterfactual” outcomes of those treat-
ments which were not actually applied, as well as
the “factual” outcome belonging to the treatment
chosen by the randomisation.
By existence of the outcomes of not actually per-
formed experiments, we mean their mathematical
existence within some mathematical-physical theory
of the phenomenon in question. So “realism” actu-
ally refers to models of reality, not to reality itself.
Moreover, it could be thought of as a somewhat
idealistic position. If we already have an adequate
mathematical physical model of reality, there would
not seem to be a pressing need to add into this the-
ory some mathematical description of outcomes of
experiments which are not performed; and even if
we do that, why should we demand that these coun-
terfactual objects satisfy the same kind of physical
constraints as the factual objects? However, it is a
fact that prior to quantum physics, realism was a
completely natural property of all physical theories.
The concepts of realism and locality together are
often considered as one principle called local realism.
Local realism is implied by the existence of local hid-
den variables, whether deterministic or stochastic.
In a precise mathematical sense, the reverse impli-
cation is also true: local realism implies that we can
construct a local hidden variable (LHV) model for
the phenomenon under study. However, one likes to
think of this assumption (or pair of assumptions),
the important thing to realize is that it is a com-
pletely unproblematic feature of all classical physi-
cal theories; freedom (no conspiracy) even more so.
The connection between Bell’s theorem and statis-
tical notions of causality has been noted many times
in the past. For instance, in a short note, Robins,
VanderWeele and Gill (2015) derive Bell’s inequal-
ity using the statistical language of causal interac-
tions. The causal graph (DAG) of observed and un-
observed variables corresponding to a classical phys-
ical description of one run of a standard Bell exper-
iment is given in Figure 1. Alice and Bob’s settings
are binary: they independently use randomisation (a
coin toss) to choose between one of two settings on a
measurement device. The outcome of each measure-
ment is also binary. Observed variables are repre-
sented by grey rectangles; unobserved (there is only
one, but of course it might be of arbitrarily complex
nature) by a white oval. The validity of this causal
model places restrictions on the joint distribution of
Fig. 1. A classical description of a Bell-CHSH type experiment entails the validity of the graphical model described by this
simple causal graph. Rectangles: observed variables; ellipse: unobserved. Settings and outcomes are both binary. Experimental
results arguably (via Bell’s theorem) show that the classical description has to be abandoned. The probability distribution of
experimental data is far outside the class of probability distributions allowed by the model.
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the observed variables; see, for instance, Ver Steeg
and Galstyan (2011).
In view of the experimental support for violation
of Bell’s inequality, the present writer prefers to
imagine a world in which “realism” is not a fun-
damental principle of physics but only an emergent
property in the familiar realm of daily life. In this
way, we can keep quantum mechanics, locality and
freedom. This position does entail taking quantum
randomness very seriously: it becomes an irreducible
feature of the physical world, a “primitive notion”;
it is not “merely” an emergent feature. He believes
that within this position, the measurement problem
(Schro¨dinger cat problem) has a decent mathemat-
ical solution, in which causality is the guiding prin-
ciple (Slava Belavkin’s “eventum mechanics”).
Many practical minded physicists claim to be ad-
herents of the so-called Many Worlds interpretation
(MWI) of quantum mechanics. In the writer’s opin-
ion (but also of many writers on quantum founda-
tions), this interpretation also entails a rejection of
“realism”, but now in a very strong sense: the reality
of an actual random path taken by Nature through
space–time is denied. The only reality is the ensem-
ble of all possible paths. Devilish experiments lead
to dead cats turning up on some paths, and alive
cats on others. According to MWI, the only real-
ity is the quantum wave-function. The reality of the
death (or not) of the cat is an illusion.
2. BELL’S INEQUALITY
To begin with, I will establish a new version of the
famous Bell inequality (more precisely: Bell-CHSH
inequality). My version is not an inequality about
theoretical expectation values, but is a probabilis-
tic inequality about experimentally observed aver-
ages. Probability derives purely from randomisation
in the experimental design.
Consider a spreadsheet containing an N × 4 ta-
ble of numbers ±1. The rows will be labelled by an
index j = 1, . . . ,N . The columns are labelled with
names A, A′, B and B′. I will denote the four num-
bers in the jth row of the table by Aj , A
′
j , Bj and
B′j . Denote by 〈AB〉= (1/N)
∑N
j=1AjBj , the aver-
age over theN rows of the product of the elements in
the A and B columns. Define 〈AB′〉, 〈A′B〉, 〈A′B′〉
similarly.
Suppose that for each row of the spreadsheet, two
fair coins are tossed independently of one another,
independently over all the rows. Suppose that de-
pending on the outcomes of the two coins, we either
get to see the value of A or A′, and either the value
of B or B′. We can therefore determine the value
of just one of the four products AB, AB′, A′B, and
A′B′, each with equal probability 14 , for each row
of the table. Denote by 〈AB〉obs the average of the
observed products of A and B (“undefined” if the
sample size is zero). Define 〈AB′〉obs, 〈A′B〉obs and
〈A′B′〉obs similarly.
Fact 1. For any four numbers A, A′, B, B′ each
equal to ±1,
AB +AB′+A′B −A′B′ =±2.(1)
Proof. Notice that
AB+AB′+A′B−A′B′ =A(B+B′)+A′(B−B′).
B and B′ are either equal to one another or unequal.
In the former case, B−B′ = 0 and B+B′ =±2; in
the latter case B −B′ =±2 and B +B′ = 0. Thus,
AB+AB′+A′B−A′B′ equals either A or A′, both
of which equal ±1, times ±2. All possibilities lead
to AB +AB′+A′B −A′B′ =±2. 
Fact 2.
〈AB〉+ 〈AB′〉+ 〈A′B〉 − 〈A′B′〉 ≤ 2.(2)
Proof. By (1),
〈AB〉+ 〈AB′〉+ 〈A′B〉 − 〈A′B′〉
= 〈AB +AB′ +A′B −A′B′〉 ∈ [−2,2]. 
Formula (2) is known as the CHSH inequality
(Clauser et al. (1969)). It is a generalisation of the
original Bell (1964) inequality.
When N is large one would expect 〈AB〉obs to
be close to 〈AB〉, and the same for the other three
averages of observed products. Hence, equation (2)
should remain approximately true when we replace
the averages of the four products over all N rows
with the averages of the four products in each of
four disjoint sub-samples of expected size N/4 each.
The following theorem expresses this intuition in a
precise and useful way. Its straightforward proof,
given in the Appendix, uses two Hoeffding (1963)
inequalities (exponential bounds on the tail of bi-
nomial and hypergeometric distributions) to prob-
abilistically bound the difference between 〈AB〉obs
and 〈AB〉, etc.
Theorem 1. Given an N × 4 spreadsheet of
numbers ±1 with columns A, A′, B and B′, sup-
pose that, completely at random, just one of A and
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A′ is observed and just one of B and B′ are observed
in every row. Then, for any η ≥ 0,
Pr(〈AB〉obs + 〈AB′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs
− 〈A′B′〉obs ≤ 2 + η)(3)
≥ 1− 8e−N(η/16)2 .
Traditional presentations of Bell’s theorem derive
the large N limit of this result. If for N →∞, experi-
mental averages converge to theoretical mean values,
then by (3) these must satisfy
〈AB〉lim + 〈AB′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B′〉lim ≤ 2.(4)
Like (2), this inequality is also called the CHSH in-
equality.
I conclude this section with an open problem. An
analysis by Vongehr (2013) of the original Bell in-
equality, which is “just” the CHSH inequality in the
situation that one of the four correlations is identi-
cally equal to ±1, suggests that the following con-
jecture might be true. I come back to this in the last
section of the paper.
Conjecture 1. Under the assumptions of The-
orem 1,
Pr(〈AB〉obs + 〈AB′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B′〉obs > 2)
(5)
≤ 12 .
3. BELL’S THEOREM
Both the original Bell inequality, and Bell-CHSH
inequality (4), can be used to prove Bell’s theorem:
quantum mechanics is incompatible with the princi-
ples of realism, locality and freedom. If we want to
hold on to all three principles, quantum mechanics
must be rejected. Alternatively, if we want to hold
on to quantum theory, we have to relinquish at least
one of those three principles.
An executive summary of the proof of Bell’s the-
orem consists purely of the following one-liner: cer-
tain models in quantum physics, referring to an ex-
periment with the layout of Figure 1, predict
〈AB〉lim + 〈AB′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B′〉lim
(6)
= 2
√
2.
More details will be given in a moment.
If we accept quantum mechanics, should we re-
ject locality, realism, or freedom? Almost no-one is
prepared to abandon freedom. It seems to be a mat-
ter of changing fashion whether one blames local-
ity or realism. I will argue that we must place the
blame on realism, and not in the weak sense of the
Copenhagen interpretation which is a kind of dog-
matic assertion that it doesn’t make any sense to ask
“what is actually going on behind the scenes”, but
in a more positive sense: the positive assertion that
quantum randomness is both real and fundamental.
In classical physics, randomness is merely the result
of dependence on uncontrollable initial conditions.
Variation in those conditions, or uncertainty about
them, leads to variation, or uncertainty, in the fi-
nal result. However, there is no such explanation
for quantum randomness. Quantum randomness is
intrinsic, nonclassical, irreducible. It is not an emer-
gent phenomenon. It is the bottom line. It is a fun-
damental feature of the fabric of reality.
For present purposes, we do not need to under-
stand any of the quantum mechanics behind (6): we
just need to know the specific statistical predictions
which follow from a particular model in quantum
physics called the EPR-B model. The initials refer
here to the celebrated paradox of Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen (1935) in a version introduced by Bohm
(1951). The EPR-B model predicts the statistics of
measurements of spin on each of an entangled pair
of spin-half quantum systems in the singlet state.
Fortunately, we do not need to understand any of
these words in order to understand what an EPR-B
experiment looks like (see Figure 1 again).
In one run of this stylised experiment, two par-
ticles are generated together at a source, and then
travel to two distant locations. Here, they are mea-
sured by two experimenters Alice and Bob. Alice
and Bob are each in possession of a measurement
apparatus which can “measure the spin of a parti-
cle in any chosen direction”. Alice (and similarly,
Bob) can freely choose (and set) a setting on her
measurement apparatus. Alice’s setting is an arbi-
trary direction in real three-dimensional space rep-
resented by a unit vector a. Her apparatus will then
register an observed outcome ±1 which is called the
observed spin of Alice’s particle in direction a. At
the same time, far away, Bob chooses a direction b
and also gets to observe an outcome ±1. This is re-
peated many times—the complete experiment will
consist of a total of N runs. We will imagine Alice
and Bob repeatedly choosing new settings for each
new run, in the same fashion as in Section 2: each
tossing a fair coin to make a binary choice between
just two possible settings, a and a′ for Alice, b and
b′ for Bob.
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First, we will complete our description of the
quantum mechanical predictions for each run sepa-
rately. For pairs of particles in the singlet state, the
prediction of quantum mechanics is that in what-
ever directions Alice and Bob perform their mea-
surements, their outcome ±1 is completely random,
that is, both marginal distributions are uniform.
The outcomes are not, however, independent. They
are correlated, with correlation depending on the
two settings. To be precise, the expected value of the
product of the outcomes is equal to −a ·b=− cos(θ)
where θ is the angle between the two directions.
With this information, we can write down the 2×
2 table for the joint probability distribution of the
outcomes at the two locations, given two settings
differing in direction by the angle θ:
+1 −1
+1 14(1− cos(θ)) 14(1 + cos(θ))
−1 14(1 + cos(θ)) 14(1− cos(θ))
Both marginals of the table are uniform. The ex-
pectation of the product of the outcomes equals the
probability that they are equal minus the probabil-
ity they are different 24(1− cos(θ))− 24(1+cos(θ)) =− cos(θ). Physicists use the word “correlation” to
refer to the raw (uncentered, unnormalised) prod-
uct moment but in this case the physicist’s and the
statistician’s correlation coincide.
As mentioned before, Alice and Bob now perform
N runs of the experiment according to the following
randomised experimental design. Alice has fixed in
advance two particular directions a and a′; Bob has
fixed in advance two particular directions b and b′.
In each run, Alice and Bob are each sent one of a
new pair of particles in the singlet state. While their
particles are en route to them, they each toss a fair
coin in order to choose one of their two measurement
directions. In total N times, Alice observes either
A = ±1 or A′ = ±1 say, and Bob observes either
B = ±1 or B′ =±1. At the end of the experiment,
four “correlations” are calculated: the four sample
averages of the products AB, AB′, A′B and A′B′.
Each correlation is based on a different subset of
runs, of expected size N/4, determined by the 2N
fair coin tosses.
Under realism we can imagine, for each run, along-
side of the outcomes of the actually measured pair
of variables, also the outcomes of the not measured
pair. Under locality, the outcomes in Alice’s wing
cannot depend on the choice of which variable is
measured in Bob’s wing. Thus, for each run there is
a suite of potential outcomes A, A′, B and B′, but
only one of A and A′, and only one of B and B′ ac-
tually gets to be observed. By freedom, the choices
are statistically independent of the actual values of
the four.
I will assume furthermore that the suite of coun-
terfactual outcomes in the jth run does not actually
depend on which particular variables were observed
in previous runs. This memoryless assumption can
be completely avoided by using the martingale ver-
sion of Hoeffding’s inequality, Gill (2003). But the
present analysis is already applicable if we imagine
N copies of the experiment each with only a sin-
gle run, all being done simultaneously in different
laboratories.
The assumptions of realism, locality and freedom
have put us firmly in the situation of the previous
section. Therefore, by Theorem 1, the four sample
correlations (empirical raw product moments) sat-
isfy (3).
Let us contrast this prediction with the quan-
tum mechanical predictions obtained with a certain
clever selection of directions. We will take the four
vectors a, a′, b and b′ to lie in the same plane.
It is then enough to specify the angles α, α′, β,
β′ ∈ [0,2pi] which they make with respect to some
fixed vector in this plane. Consider the choice α= 0,
α′ = pi/2, β = 5pi/4, β′ = 3pi/4; see Figure 2. The
differences |α− β|, |α− β′|, |α′ − β| are all equal to
pi ± pi/4: these pairs of angles are only 45 degrees
away from being opposite to one another; the corre-
sponding measurements are quite strongly positively
correlated. On the other hand, |α′−β′|= pi/4: these
two angles are 45 degrees away from being equal
and the corresponding measurements are as strongly
a
a′
b′
b
Fig. 2. Four measurement directions, all in the same plane.
Alice’s settings are the two orthogonal directions a, a′, and
Bob’s settings are the orthogonal b, b′. Relative to one an-
other, the pairs are arranged so that a′ and b′ are close to
pointing in the same direction, while at the same time the
other three pairs of one of Alice’s and one of Bob’s settings
(a and b, a and b′, a′ and b) are all equally close to pointing
in opposite directions.
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anti-correlated, as the other pairs were strongly
correlated. Three of the correlations are equal to
− cos(3pi/4) =−(−1/√2) = 1/√2 and the fourth is
equal to − cos(pi/4) = −1/√2. Thus, we would ex-
pect to see, up to statistical variation,
〈AB〉obs + 〈AB′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B′〉obs
≈ 4/
√
2 = 2
√
2≈ 2.828,
cf. (6). By Tsirelson’s inequality (Cirel’son (1980)),
this is actually the largest absolute deviation from
the CHSH inequality which is allowed by quantum
mechanics.
Many experiments have been performed confirm-
ing these predictions. Two particularly notable ones
are those of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger (1982) in
Orsay, Paris, and of Weihs et al. (1998) in Innsbruck
(later I will discuss two of the most recent).
In these experiments, the choices of which direc-
tion to measure were not literally made with coin
tosses, but by rather more practical physical sys-
tems. In Alain Aspect’s Orsay and Gregor Weihs’
Innsbruck experiments, the separation between the
locations of Alice and Bob was large; the time it
took from initiating the choice of random direction
to measure to completion of the measurement was
small: so small, that Alice’s measurement is com-
plete before a signal traveling at the speed of light
could possibly transmit Bob’s choice to Alice’s loca-
tion. However, note that this depends on what one
considers to be the time each randomisation starts
happening. Weihs’ experiment improves on Aspect’s
in this respect.
The data gathered from the Innsbruck experi-
ment is available online. It had N ≈ 15,000; and
found 〈AB〉obs + 〈AB′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B′〉obs =
2.73± 0.022, the statistical accuracy (standard de-
viation) following from a standard delta-method
calculation assuming i.i.d. observations per setting
pair. The reader can check that this corresponds
to accuracy obtained by a standard computation
using binomial variances of the counts for each of
the four roughly equal sub-samples. By (3), un-
der realism, locality and freedom, the chance that
〈AB〉obs+〈AB′〉obs+〈A′B〉obs−〈A′B′〉obs would ex-
ceed 2.73 is less than 10−12.
The experiment deviates in several ways from
what has been described so far, and I will summarise
them here.
An unimportant difference is the physical system
used: polarisation of entangled photons rather than
spin of entangled spin-half particles (e.g., electrons).
An important difference between the idealisation
and the truth concerns the picture of Alice and Bob
repeating some actions N times with N fixed in
advance. The experimenters do not control when a
pair of photons will leave the source nor how many
times this happens. Even talking about “pairs of
photons” is using classical physical language which
can be acutely misleading. In actual fact, all we ob-
serve are individual detection events (time, current
setting, outcome) at each of the two detectors, that
is, at each measurement apparatus.
Complicating this still further is the fact that
many particles fail to be detected at all. One could
say that the outcome of measuring one particle is
not binary but ternary: +, −, or no detection. If
neither particle of a pair is detected, then we do not
even know there is a pair at all. N was not only
not fixed in advance: it is not even known. The data
cannot be summarised in a list of pairs of settings
and pairs of outcomes (whether binary of ternary),
but consists of two lists of the random times of def-
inite measurement outcomes in each wing of the ex-
periment together with the settings in force at the
time of the measurements. The settings are being
extremely rapidly, randomly switched, between the
two alternative values. When detection events occur
close together in time they are treated as belonging
to a pair of photons.
In Weihs’ experiment, only 1 in 20 of the events
in each wing of the experiment seemed to be paired
with an event in the other. If all detections corre-
spond to emissions of pairs from the source, then
for every 400 pairs of photons, just one pair leads to
a paired event, 2× 19 lead to unpaired events, and
the remaining 361 to no observed event at all.
We will return to the issue of whether the idealised
picture of N pairs of particles, each separately be-
ing measured, each particle in just one of two ways,
is really appropriate, in a later section; we will also
take a look then at two more, very recent, exper-
iments. However, the point is that quantum me-
chanics does seem to promise that experiments of
this nature could in principle be done, and if so,
there seems no reason to doubt they could violate
the CHSH inequality. Three correlations more or less
equal to 1/
√
2 and one equal to −1/√2 have been
measured in the lab. Not to mention that the whole
curve − cos(θ) has been experimentally recovered.
Right now the situation is that at least four ma-
jor experimental groups (Singapore, Brisbane, Vi-
enna, Illinois) seem to be vying to be the first to
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perform a successful and completely “loophole-free”
experiment, predictions being that this is no more
than five years away (cf. Marek Z˙ukowski, quoted in
Merali (2011)). It will be a major achievement, the
crown of more than fifty years’ labour.
4. REALISM, LOCALITY, FREEDOM
This section and the next are about metaphysics
and can safely be skipped by the reader impatient
to learn more about statistical aspects of Bell ex-
periments.
The EPR-B correlations have a second message
beyond the fact that they violate the CHSH inequal-
ity. They also exhibit perfect anti-correlation in the
case that the two directions of measurement are ex-
actly equal—and perfect correlation in the case that
they are exactly opposite. This brings us straight to
the EPR argument not for the nonlocality of quan-
tum mechanics, but for the incompleteness of quan-
tum mechanics.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) were re-
vulsed by the idea that the “last word” in physics
would be a “merely” statistical theory. Physics
should explain why, in each individual instance,
what actually happens does happen. The belief that
every “effect” must have a “cause” has driven West-
ern science since Aristotle. Now according to the sin-
glet correlations, if Alice were to measure the spin
of her particle in direction a, it is certain that if
Bob were to do the same, he would find exactly
the opposite outcome. Since it is inconceivable that
Alice’s choice has any immediate influence on the
particle over at Bob’s place, it must be that the
outcome of measuring Bob’s particle in the direc-
tion a is predetermined “in the particle” as it were.
The measurement outcomes from measuring spin in
all conceivable directions on both particles must be
predetermined properties of those particles. The ob-
served correlation is merely caused by their origin at
a common source.
Thus Einstein used locality, together with the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics itself, to infer real-
ism or counterfactual definiteness in the strong sense
that the outcomes of measurements on physical sys-
tems are predefined properties of those systems, car-
ried in them, and merely revealed by the act of
measurement. From this, he argued the incomplete-
ness of quantum mechanics—it describes some ag-
gregate properties of collectives of physical systems,
but does not even deign to talk about physically
definitely existing properties of individual systems.
Whether it needed external support or not, the no-
tion of counterfactual definiteness is nothing strange
in all of physics (prior to the invention of quantum
mechanics). It comes for free with a deterministic
view of the world as a collection of objects blindly
obeying definite rules.
Instead of assuming quantum mechanics and de-
riving counterfactual definiteness, Bell turned the
EPR argument on its head. He assumes three prin-
ciples which Einstein would have endorsed anyway,
and uses them to get a contradiction with quantum
mechanics; and the first is counterfactual definite-
ness. We must first agree that though, say, only A
and B are actually measured in one particular run,
still, in a mathematical sense, A′ and B′ also exist
(or at least may be constructed) alongside of the
other two; and moreover, they may be thought to
be located in space and time just where one would
imagine. Only after that does it make sense to dis-
cuss locality : the assumption that which variable is
being observed at Alice’s location does not influence
the values taken by the other two at Bob’s location.
Having assumed realism and locality, we can bring
the freedom assumption into play. As we have seen,
it allowed us to analyse our experiment with clas-
sical probability tools based on a classically ran-
domised design. Some writers like to associate the
freedom assumption with the free will of the exper-
imenter, others with the existence of “true” ran-
domness in other physical processes: either way,
one metaphysical assumption is justified by another.
I would rather see it in a practical way: we under-
stand pseudo-randomness very well, and its princi-
ples underly coin tossing just as much as pseudo ran-
dom generators. We use randomisation effectively in
all kinds of contexts (randomised algorithms, ran-
domised clinical trials, randomised designs). Do we
really want to believe that the observed correlations
±0.7071 (three positive, one negative) come about
through a physical mechanism by which the out-
comes of two coin tosses and two polarisation mea-
surements are all exquisitely dependent on one an-
other through all four being jointly pre-determined
by events in the deep past? When such a hypothe-
sis is otherwise completely unnecessary? (Otherwise,
we never see spatial-temporal correlations follow-
ing this sign pattern, larger in absolute value than
0.5). A mechanism which is completely unknown?
A mechanism which ensures in effect that Alice’s
photon knows how Bob’s photon is being measured?
Yet, a mechanism which cannot make any of those
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correlations larger in absolute value than 0.7071,
though if it really were the case that Alice’s photon
knows Bob’s setting, three positive and one negative
correlation ±1.0 could have been achieved.
I think that Occam’s razor tells us to discard this
flavour of super-determinism, also known as conspir-
acy. In fact, to abandon freedom means to abandon
science: we may discard all empirical (observational)
data. Everything is explained but nothing can be
predicted.
Keeping freedom, we have to make a choice be-
tween two other inconceivable possibilities: do we
reject locality, or do we reject realism?
Here, I would like to call on Occam’s principle
again. Suppose realism is true. Instead of invok-
ing the fact that a collection of four coin toss out-
comes and photo-detector clicks were jointly prede-
termined in the deep past, we now have to invoke
instantaneous communication across large distances
of the outcomes of these processes, by as yet un-
known processes, and again with only the extremely
subtle and special effects which quantum mechanics
seems to predict. Alice cannot communicate with
Bob through this phenomenon. There is no observ-
able action-at-a-distance. The surface predictions of
quantum mechanics are perfectly compatible with
relativistic causality. It is only when we hypothesise
a hidden layer that we run into difficulties.
It seems to me that we are pretty much forced
into rejecting realism, which, please remember, is
actually an idealistic concept: outcomes “exist” of
measurements which were not performed. However,
I admit it goes against all instinct. In the case of
equal settings, how can it be that the outcomes are
equal and opposite, if they were not predetermined
at the source?
Though it is perhaps only a comfort blanket, I
would like here to appeal to the limitations of our
own brains, the limitations we experience in our “un-
derstanding” of physics due to our own rather spe-
cial position in the universe. In philosophy, this no-
tion is called embodied cognition. There is also hard
empirical evidence for this idea.
According to cognitive scientists (see, for instance,
Spelke and Kinzler (2007)), our brains are at birth
hardwired with various basic conceptions about the
world. These “modules” are called systems of core
knowledge. The idea is that we cannot acquire new
knowledge from our sensory experiences (including
learning from experiments: we cry, and food and/or
comfort is provided) without having a prior frame-
work in which to interpret the data of experience
and experiment. It seems that we have modules for
algebra and modules for geometry: basic notions
of number and of space. Most interestingly in the
present context, we also have modules for causality.
We distinguish between objects and agents (we learn
that we ourselves are agents). Objects are acted
on by agents. Objects have continuous existence in
space–time, they are local. Agents can act on ob-
jects, also at a distance. Together this seems to me
to be a built-in assumption of determinism: we have
been created (by evolution) to operate in an Aris-
totelian world, a world in which every effect has a
cause.
The argument (from physics, and by Occam’s
razor, not from neuroscience) for abandoning re-
alism is made eloquently by Boris Tsirelson in
an internet encyclopaedia article on entanglement
(Citizendium: entanglement). It was Tsirelson from
whom I borrowed the terms counterfactual definite-
ness, relativistic local causality, and no-conspiracy.
He points out that it is a mathematical fact that
quantum physics is consistent with relativistic local
causality and with no-conspiracy. In all of physics,
there is no evidence against either of these two prin-
ciples.
I would like to close this section by mention-
ing a beautiful paper by Masanes, Acin and Gisin
(2006) who argue in a very general setting (i.e.,
not assuming quantum theory, or local realism, or
anything) that quantum nonlocality, by which they
mean the violation of Bell inequalities, together
with nonsignalling, which is the property that the
marginal probability distribution seen by Alice of A
does not depend on whether Bob measures B of B′,
together imply indeterminism: that is to say: that
the world is stochastic, not deterministic.
5. RESOLUTION OF THE MEASUREMENT
PROBLEM
The measurement problem, also known as Schro¨din-
ger’s cat problem, is the problem of how to recon-
cile two apparently mutually contradictory parts of
quantum mechanics. When a quantum system is iso-
lated from the rest of the world, its quantum state
(a vector, normalised to have unit length, in Hilbert
space) evolves unitarily, deterministically. When we
look at a quantum system from outside, by mak-
ing a measurement on it in a laboratory, the state
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collapses to one of the eigenvectors of an operator
corresponding to the particular measurement, and
it does so with probabilities equal to the squared
lengths of the projections of the original state vector
into the eigenspaces. Yet the system being measured
together with the measurement apparatus used to
probe it form together a much larger quantum sys-
tem, supposedly evolving unitarily and determinis-
tically in time.
Accepting that quantum theory is intrinsically
stochastic, and accepting the reality of measure-
ment outcomes, led Belavkin (2000) to a mathe-
matical framework which he called eventum me-
chanics which (in my opinion) indeed reconciles the
two faces of quantum physics (Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion, von Neumann collapse) by a most simple de-
vice. Moreover, it is based on ideas of causality with
respect to time. I have attempted to explain this
model in as simple terms as possible in Gill (2009).
The following words will only make sense to those
with some familiarity with quantum mechanics.
The idea is to model the world in the conventional
way with a Hilbert space, a quantum state on that
space, and a unitary evolution. Inside this frame-
work, we look for a collection of bounded operators
on the Hilbert space which all commute with one an-
other, and which are causally compatible with the
unitary evolution of the space, in the sense that they
all commute with past copies of themselves (in the
Heisenberg picture, one thinks of the quantum ob-
servables as changing, the state as fixed; each ob-
servable corresponds to a time indexed family of
bounded operators). We call this special family of
operators the beables: they correspond to physical
properties in a classical-like world which can co-
exist, all having definite values at the same time, and
definite values in the past too. The state and the uni-
tary evolution together determine a joint probabil-
ity distribution of these time-indexed variables, that
is, a stochastic process. At any fixed time, we can
condition the state of the system on the past trajec-
tories of the beables. This leads to a quantum state
over all bounded operators which commute with all
the beables.
The result is a theory in which the deterministic
and stochastic parts of traditional quantum theory
are combined into one harmonious whole. In fact,
the notion of restricting attention to a sub-class of
all observables goes back a long way in quantum
theory under the name super-selection rule; and ab-
stract quantum theory (and quantum field theory)
has long worked with arbitrary algebras of observ-
ables, not necessarily the full algebra of a specific
Hilbert space. With respect to those traditional ap-
proaches the only novelty is to suppose that the uni-
tary evolution when restricted to the sub-algebra is
not invertible. It is an endomorphism, not an iso-
morphism. There is an arrow of time.
It turns out that the theory is mathematically
equivalent to important versions of the continuous
spontaneous localisation (CSL) model, a way to
solve the measurement problem by adding an ex-
plicit stochastic collapse term to the Schro¨dinger
equation (Initially, the two theories seem quite dif-
ferent in nature). The problem of crafting a rela-
tivistically invariant version of CSL remained open
for many years (and was a major obstruction to
its acceptance) yet just recently this problem has
been solved by Bedingham (2011). See Pearle (1997,
2012) for further details.
CSL has been eloquently championed over the
years by Philip Pearle and I refer the reader to his
many works, in particular the two just cited, both
explaining CSL and explaining why it does solve the
measurement problem, while MWI does not.
6. LOOPHOLES
In real world experiments, the ideal experimen-
tal protocol of particles leaving a source at definite
times, and being measured at distant locations ac-
cording to locally randomly chosen settings cannot
be implemented.
Experiments have been done with pairs of entan-
gled ions, separated only by a short distance. The
measurement of each ion takes a relatively long time,
but at least it is almost always successful. Such ex-
periments are obviously blemished by the so-called
communication or locality loophole. Each particle
can know very well how the other one is being mea-
sured.
Many very impressive experiments have been per-
formed with pairs of entangled photons. Here, the
measurement of each photon can be performed very
rapidly and at huge distance from one another. How-
ever, many photons fail to be detected at all. For
many events in one wing of the experiment, there is
often no event at all in the other wing, even though
the physicists are pretty sure that almost all detec-
tion events do correspond to (members of) entangled
pairs of photons. This is called the detection loop-
hole. Popularly it is thought to be merely connected
10 R. D. GILL
to the efficiency of photo-detectors and that it will
be easily overcome by the development of better and
better photo-detectors. Certainly that is necessary,
but not sufficient, as I will explain.
In Weihs’ experiment mentioned earlier, only 1 in
20 of the events in each wing of the experiment is
paired with an event in the other wing. Thus, of
every 400 pairs of photons—if we assume that de-
tection and nondetection occur independently of one
another in the two wings of the experiment—only 1
pair results in a successful measurement of both the
photons; there are 19 further unpaired events in each
wing of the experiment; and there were 361 pairs of
photons not observed at all.
Imagine (anthropocentrically) classical particles
about to leave the source and aiming to fake the
singlet correlations. If they are allowed to go unde-
tected often enough, they can engineer any correla-
tions they like, as follows. Consider two new photons
about to leave the source. They agree between one
another with what pair of settings they would like
to be measured. Having decided on the desired set-
ting pair, they next generate outcomes ±1 by draw-
ing them from the joint probability distribution of
outcomes given settings, which they want the ex-
perimenter to see. Only then do they each travel to
their corresponding detector. There, each particle
compares the setting it had chosen in advance with
the setting chosen by Alice or Bob. If they are not
the same, it decides to go undetected. With proba-
bility 1/4 we will have successful detections in both
wings of the experiment. For those detections, the
pair of settings according to which the particles are
being measured is identical to the pair of settings
they had aimed at in advance.
This example illustrates that if one wants to ex-
perimentally prove a violation of local realism with-
out making the untestable statistical assumption of
“missing at random”, known as the fair-sampling
assumption in this context, one has to put limits
on the amount of “nondetection”. There is a long
history and big literature on this topic. I will just
mention one of such results.
Larsson (1998, 1999) has proved variants of the
CHSH inequality which take account of the possi-
bility of nondetections. The idea is that under lo-
cal realism, as the proportion of “missing” measure-
ments increases from zero, the upper bound “2” in
the CHSH inequality (4) increases, too. We intro-
duce a quantity γ called the efficiency of the ex-
periment : this is the minimum over all setting pairs
of the probability that Alice sees an outcome given
Bob sees an outcome (and vice versa). It is not to
be confused with “detector efficiency”. It turns out
that the (sharp) bound on 〈AB〉lim + 〈AB′〉lim +
〈A′B〉lim−〈A′B′〉lim set by local realism is no longer
2 as in (4), but 2 + δ, where δ = δ(γ) = 4(γ−1 − 1).
As long as γ ≥ 1/√2 ≈ 0.7071, the bound 2 + δ
is smaller than 2
√
2. Weihs’ experiment has an effi-
ciency of 5%. If only we could increase it to above
71% and simultaneously keep the state and mea-
surements close to perfection, we could have defini-
tive experimental proof of Bell’s theorem.
This would be correct for a “clocked” experi-
ment. Suppose now particles determine themselves
the times that they are measured. Thus, a local
realist pair of particles trying to fake the singlet
correlations could arrange between themselves that
their measurement times are delayed by smaller or
greater amounts depending on whether the setting
they see at the detector is the setting they want
to see, or not. It turns out that this gives our de-
vious particles even more scope for faking correla-
tions. Larsson and Gill (2004) called this the coin-
cidence loophole, and derived the sharp bound on
〈AB〉lim+ 〈AB′〉lim+ 〈A′B〉lim−〈A′B′〉lim set by lo-
cal realism is 2+δ, where now δ = δ(γ) = 6(γ−1−1).
As long as γ ≥ 3(1−1/√2)≈ 0.8787, the bound 2+δ
is smaller than 2
√
2. We need to get experimental
efficiency above 88%, and keep everything else close
to perfect at the very limits allowed by quantum
physics.
How far is there still to go? In 2013, the Vienna
group published a paper in the journal Nature en-
titled “Bell violation using entangled photons with-
out the fair-sampling assumption” (Giustina et al.
(2013)). The authors write “this is the very first time
that an experiment has been done using photons
which does not suffer from the detection loophole”,
and moreover, the experiment “makes the photon
the first physical system for which each of the main
loopholes has been closed, albeit in different exper-
iments”.
It was however rapidly pointed out that the ex-
periment was actually vulnerable to the coincidence
loophole, not “just” to the detection loophole. Now,
it actually should be possible to simply re-analyse
the data from that experiment, defining coincidences
with respect to an externally defined lattice of time
intervals instead of relative to observed detection
times only. Ideally, this will only slightly increase
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the “singles rate” and slightly decrease the num-
ber of coincidences, thereby slightly decreasing both
size and statistical significance of the Bell violation,
but hopefully without altering the substantive con-
clusion. A more stringent re-analysis of the data
(Larsson et al. (2013)) has confirmed that the initial
claims were justified.
In the meantime, exploiting this gap between re-
sults and claims, a consortium led by researchers
from Illinois have published their own experimental
results, also reporting that theirs is “the first exper-
iment that fully closes the detection loophole with
photons, which are then the only system in which
both loopholes have been closed, albeit not simulta-
neously” (Christensen et al. (2013)). They used the
Larsson and Gill (2004) inequality.
Is this just a question of prestige? No: various new
quantum technologies depend on quantum entangle-
ment, and in particular, various cryptographic com-
munication protocols are not secure as long as it is
possible to “fake” violation of Bell inequalities with
classical systems.
It is logically possible that quantum mechanics
itself could prevent one ever from performing a
both successful and loophole-free experiment. Quan-
tum uncertainty relations could in principle pre-
vent the creation of a multipartite quantum sys-
tem, whose components can be measured in well-
separated space–time regions, while simultaneously
those components are in the required joint entangled
state. I christened this possibility “Bell’s fifth posi-
tion” in Gill (2003). Here, I just mention that the
possibility had already been championed for many
years by Emilios Santos, whose paper Santos (2005)
is well worth reading.
On the other hand, continuous improvement of
experimental techniques over more than fifty years
has seen continuous pushing of detection efficiency
toward the critical boundaries, without any attenua-
tion of the quantum correlations of the singlet state.
Now that we are getting very close indeed to the
boundary, it would seem very unlikely that we won’t
be able to go past it.
I conclude this section with mention of some re-
cent work on the conspiracy loophole. Recently, Gal-
licchio, Friedman and Kaiser (2014) have made the
novel suggestion to rule out conspiracy by the exper-
imental device of choosing settings with the help of
detection times of photons arriving from widely sep-
arated, and very distant galaxies from the dawn of
time. This idea will probably be implemented soon
in an experiment by Zeilinger. I am not however con-
vinced by this idea: though Alice’s setting choice is
triggered by a photon which cannot yet have inter-
acted with Bob’s measurement device or the source,
still the setting itself is also partially determined
by Alice’s detection apparatus, and it certainly has.
And if there is dependence between subsequent set-
tings on Alice’s side, then on Bob’s side it soon
becomes possible to predict future settings (this is
known as the memory loophole).
In my opinion, we have to rule out conspiracy (en-
sure freedom) by choosing settings by a cascade of
classical randomness (coins, pseudo RNGs, etc.). We
can never logically rule out conspiratorial super de-
terminism, but we can make appeal to this escape
clause ludicrous.
7. BELL’S THEOREM WITHOUT
INEQUALITIES
In recent years new proofs of Bell’s theorem have
been invented which appear to avoid probability
or statistics altogether, such as the famous GHZ
(Greenberger, Horne, Zeilinger) proof. Experiments
have already been done implementing the set-up
of these proofs, and physicists have claimed that
these experiments prove quantum—nonlocality by
the outcomes of a finite number of runs: no statis-
tics, no inequalities (yet their papers do exhibit error
bars).
Such a proof runs along the following lines. Sup-
pose local realism is true. Suppose also that some
event A is certain. Suppose that it then follows from
local realism that another event B has probability
zero, while under quantum mechanics it can be ar-
ranged that the same event B has probability one.
Paradoxical, but not a contradiction in terms: the
catch is that events A and B are events under dif-
ferent experimental conditions: it is only under local
realism and freedom that the events A and B can
be situated in the same sample space. Freedom is
needed here to equate the probabilities of observ-
able events with those of unobservable events, just
as in our own proof of Bell’s theorem. We need to
be able to assume that the subset of runs of the ex-
periment in which the events were observable are a
random sample of the set of all repetitions.
When we use randomisation in experimental de-
sign, we are assuming that randomisation is inde-
pendent of pre-existing unobserved characteristics of
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the experimental units. Is it plausible that the out-
comes of coin tosses used to create a randomised ex-
perimental design were predetermined together with
properties of the experimental units under study, so
that our random sub-samples of units being given
a particular treatment, are actually heavily biased
with regard to the properties we measure on them?
Of course, under a purely deterministic world view
(super-determinism) everything that was ever go-
ing to happen was determined in advance, at the
dawn of creation. But even in a deterministic world,
pseudo-randomness exists and is well understood.
As an example, consider the following scenario,
generalizing the Bell-CHSH scenario to the situation
where the outcome of the measurements on the two
particles is not binary, but an arbitrary real number.
This situation has been studied by Zohren and Gill
(2008), Zohren et al. (2010).
Just as before, settings are chosen at random in
the two wings of the experiment. Under local realism
we can introduce variables A, A′, B and B′ repre-
senting the outcomes (real numbers) in one run of
the experiment, both of the actually observed vari-
ables, and of those not observed.
It turns out that it is possible under quantum
mechanics to arrange that Pr{B′ ≤ A} = Pr{A ≤
B} = Pr{B ≤ A′} = 1 while Pr{B′ ≤ A′} = 0. On
the other hand, under local realism, Pr{B′ ≤ A}=
Pr{A ≤ B} = Pr{B ≤ A′} = 1 implies Pr{B′ ≤
A′}= 1.
Note that the four probability measures un-
der which, under quantum mechanics, Pr{A ≤ B},
Pr{A ≥ B′}, Pr{A′ ≥ B}, Pr{A′ ≥ B′} are defined,
refer to four different experimental set-ups, accord-
ing to which of the four pairs (A,B), etc. we are
measuring.
The experiment to verify these quantum mechan-
ical predictions has not yet been performed though
some colleagues are interested. Interestingly, though
it requires a quantum entangled state, that state
should not be the maximally entangled state (the
amount of entanglement of a state can be quantified
in many ways, for instance through entropy notions,
but it would take us too far into the quantum for-
malism to explain that here). Maximal “quantum
nonlocality” is quite different from maximal entan-
glement. And this is not an isolated example of the
phenomenon.
Note that even if the experiment is repeated a
large number of times, it can never prove that prob-
abilities like Pr{A ≤ B} are exactly equal to 1. It
can only give strong statistical evidence, at best,
that the probability in question is very close to 1
indeed. But actually experiments are never perfect
and more likely is that after a number of repeti-
tions, one discovers that {A>B} actually has posi-
tive probability—that event will happen a few times.
The experimenter cannot create the required quan-
tum state exactly, measurements are not perfect.
Thus, the logical conclusion from the experiment is
that nothing has been proved.
To be sure, one can give a proof of Bell’s theorem
that the theory of quantum mechanics is in conflict
with local realism, which relies only on logic, not
on probability. But if we want to use the set-up of
the proof as a set-up for an experiment, we move
to a different ball-park. We want to perform an ex-
periment which gives strong evidence that nature is
incompatible with local realism. It turns out that
whatever experimental set-up we take, we will nec-
essarily find ourselves explicitly or implicitly in the
business of statistically proving violation of inequal-
ities, as the next section will make clear.
8. BETTER BELL INEQUALITIES
Why all the attention to the CHSH inequality?
There are others around, aren’t there? And are there
alternatives to “inequalities” altogether? I will ar-
gue here that the whole story is “just” a collection
of inequalities, and the reason behind this can be
expressed in a simple geometric picture.
In a precise sense, the CHSH inequality is the only
Bell inequality worth mentioning in the scenario of
two parties, two measurements per party, two out-
comes per measurement. Let us generalise this sce-
nario and consider p parties, each choosing between
one of q measurements, where each measurement
has r possible outcomes (further generalisations are
possible to unbalanced experiments, multi-stage ex-
periments, and so on). I want to explain why CHSH
plays a very central role in the 2× 2× 2 case, and
why in general, generalised Bell inequalities are all
there is when studying the p× q× r case. The short
answer is: these inequalities are the bounding hyper-
planes of a convex polytope of “everything allowed
by local realism”. The vertices of the polytope are
deterministic local realistic models. An arbitrary lo-
cal realist model is a mixture of the models corre-
sponding to the vertices. Such a mixture is a hidden
variables model, the hidden variable being the par-
ticular random vertex chosen by the mixing distri-
bution in a specific instance.
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From quantum mechanics, after we have fixed a
joint p-partite quantum state, and sets of q r-valued
measurements per party, we will be able to write
down probability tables p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) where the
variables x, y, etc. take values in 1, . . . , q, and label
the measurement used by the first, second, . . . party.
The variables a, b, etc., take values in 1, . . . , r and la-
bel the possible outcomes of the measurements. Al-
together, there are qprp “elementary probabilities”
in this list of tables. More generally, any specific
instance of a theory, whether local-realist, quantum
mechanical, or beyond, generates such a list of prob-
ability tables, and defines thereby a point in qprp-
dimensional Euclidean space.
We can therefore envisage the sets of all local-
realist models, all quantum models, and so on, as
subsets of qprp-dimensional Euclidean space. Now,
whatever the theory, for any values of x, y, etc.,
the sum of the probabilities p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) must
equal 1. These are called normalisation constraints.
Moreover, whatever the theory, all probabilities
must be nonnegative: positivity constraints. Quan-
tum mechanics is certainly local in the sense that
the marginal distribution of the outcome of any one
of the measurements of any one of the parties does
not depend on which measurements are performed
by the other parties. Since marginalization corre-
sponds again to summation of probabilities, these
so-called no-signalling constraints are expressed by
linear equalities in the elements in the probability
tables corresponding to a specific model. Not sur-
prisingly, local-realist models also satisfy the no-
signalling constraints.
We will call a list of probability tables restricted
only by positivity, normalisation and no-signalling,
but otherwise completely arbitrary, a no-signalling
model. The positivity constraints are linear inequal-
ities which place us in the positive orthant of Eu-
clidean space. Normalisation and no-signalling are
linear equalities which place us in a certain affine
sub-space of Euclidean space. Intersection of orthant
and affine sub-space creates a convex polytope: the
set of all no-signalling models. We want to study the
sets of local-realist models, of quantum models, and
of no-signalling models. We already know that local-
realist and quantum are contained in no-signalling.
It turns out that these sets are successively larger,
and strictly so: quantum includes all local-realist and
more (that’s Bell’s theorem); no-signalling includes
all quantum and more (that is Tsirelson’s inequality
combined with an example of a no-signalling model
which violates Tsirelson’s inequality).
Let us investigate the local-realist models in more
detail. A special class of local-realist models are
the local-deterministic models. A local-deterministic
model is a model in which all of the probabilities
p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) equal 0 or 1 and the no-signalling
constraints are all satisfied. This implies that for
each possible measurement by each party, the out-
come is prescribed, independently of what measure-
ments are made by the other parties. Now, it is easy
to see that any local-realist model corresponds to
a probability mixture of local-deterministic models.
After all, it “is” a joint probability distribution of si-
multaneous outcomes of each possible measurement
on each system, and thus it “is” a probability mix-
ture of degenerate distributions: fix the random ele-
ment ω, and each outcome of each possible measure-
ment of each party is fixed; we recover their joint
distribution by picking ω at random.
This makes the set of local-realist models a con-
vex polytope: all mixtures of a finite set of extreme
points. Therefore, it can also be described as the in-
tersection of a finite collection of half-spaces, each
half-space corresponding to a boundary hyperplane.
It can also be shown that the set of quantum mod-
els is closed and convex, but its boundary is very
difficult to describe.
Let us think of these three models from “within”
the affine sub-space of no-signalling and normali-
sation. Relative to this sub-space, the no-signalling
models form a full (nonempty interior) closed con-
vex polytope. The quantum models form a strictly
smaller closed, convex, full set. The local-realist
models form a strictly smaller still, closed, convex,
full polytope.
Slowly, we have arrived at a rather simple picture,
Figure 3. Imagine a square, with a circle inscribed in
it, and with another smaller square inscribed within
the circle. The outer square represents the bound-
ary of the set of all no-signalling models. The circle
is the boundary of the convex set of all quantum
models. The square inscribed within the circle is the
boundary of the set of all local-realist models. The
picture is oversimplified. For instance, the vertices of
the local-realist polytope are also extreme points of
the quantum body and vertices of the no-signalling
polytope.
A generalised Bell inequality is simply a bound-
ary hyperplane, or face, of the local-realist poly-
tope, relative to the normalisation and no-signalling
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Fig. 3. Left: a caricature of the 2× 2× 2 case. It actually lives in 8, not 2 dimensions. Right: caricature of the general case
in which (bottom left) a further possibility is allowed: no purple between the green and grey. Artwork: Daniel Cavalcanti.
affine sub-space, and excluding boundaries corre-
sponding to the positivity constraints. I will call
these interesting boundary hyperplanes “nontriv-
ial”. In the 2 × 2 × 2 case, for which the affine
sub-space where all the action lies is 8-dimensional,
the local-realist polytope has exactly 8 nontrivial
boundary hyperplanes. They correspond exactly to
all possible CHSH inequalities (obtained by permut-
ing outcomes, measurements and parties). Thus, in
the 2× 2× 2 case, the Bell-CHSH inequality is in-
deed “all there is”.
When we increase p, q or r, new Bell inequali-
ties turn up, and moreover, keep turning up (“new”
means not obtainable from “old” by omitting parties
or measurements or grouping outcomes). It seems a
hopeless (and probably pointless) exercise to try to
classify them.
A natural question is whether every nontrivial
generalised Bell inequality can actually be violated
by quantummechanics. I posed this as an open ques-
tion a long time ago, and for a long time the answer
seemed probably be “yes”. However, a nice counter-
example has recently been discovered; see Almeida
et al. (2010).
Quite a few generalised Bell inequalities have
turned out to be of particular interest, for instance,
the work of Zohren and Gill concerned the 2× 2× r
case and discussed a class of inequalities, one for
each r, whose asymptotic properties could be stud-
ied as r increased to infinity. Further statistical con-
nections to missing data problems and optimal ex-
perimental design, have been exploited by van Dam,
Gill and Gru¨nwald (2005) and Gill (2007).
Much of the material of this section is covered in
an excellent survey paper by Brunner et al. (2014),
from which I took, with the permission both of the
authors and of the artist Daniel Cavalcanti, the two
illustrations in Figure 3: the first is a cartoon of the
2× 2× 2 case, the second of the general case.
9. QUANTUM RANDI CHALLENGES
A second reason for the specific form of the proof
of Bell’s theorem which started this paper is that
it lends itself well to design of computer challenges.
Every year, new researchers publish, or try to pub-
lish, papers in which they claim that Bell made
some fundamental errors, and in which they put for-
ward a specific local realist model which allegedly
reproduces the quantum correlations. The papers
are long and complicated; the author finds it hard
to get the work published, and suspects a conspir-
acy by “The Establishment”. The claims regularly
succeed in attracting media attention, occasionally
becoming head-line news in serious science journal-
ism; some papers are published, too, and not only
in obscure journals.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evi-
dence. I used to find it useful in debates with “Bell-
deniers” to challenge them to implement their local
realist model as computer programs for a network
of classical computers, connected so as to mimic the
time and space separations of the Bell-CHSH exper-
iments.
The protocol of the challenge I issued in the past is
the following. Bell-denier is to write computer pro-
grams for three personal computers, which are to
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play the roles of source S , measurement station A,
and measurement station B. The following is to be
repeated say 15,000 times. First, S sends messages
to A and B. Next, connections between A, B and
S are severed. Next, from the outside world so to
speak, I deliver the results of two coin tosses (per-
formed by myself), separately of course, as input
setting to A and to B. Heads or tails correspond to
a request for A or A′ at A, and for B or B′ at B. The
two measurement stations A and B now each output
an outcome ±1. Settings and outcomes are collected
for later data analysis, Bell-denier’s computers are
re-connected; next run.
Bell-denier’s computers can contain huge tables of
random numbers, shared between the three, and of
course they can use pseudo-random number gener-
ators of any kind. By sharing the pseudo-random
keys in advance, they have resources to any amount
of shared randomness they like.
In Gill (2003), I showed how a martingale Hoeffd-
ing inequality gives an exponential bound like (3)
in the situation just described. This enabled me to
choose N , and a criterion for win/lose (say, halfway
between 2 and 2
√
2), and a guarantee to Bell-denier
(at least so many runs with each combination of set-
tings), such that I would happily bet 3000 Euros any
day that Bell-denier’s computers will fail the chal-
lenge.
The point (for me) was not to win money for my-
self, but to enable the Bell-denier who considers ac-
cepting the challenge (a personal challenge between
the two of us, with adjudicators to enforce the pro-
tocol) to discover for him or herself that “it can-
not be done”. It is important that the adjudicators
do not need to look inside the programs written by
the Bell-denier, and preferably do not even need to
look inside his computers. They are black boxes. The
only thing that has to be enforced are the commu-
nication rules. However, there are difficulties here.
What if Bell-denier’s computers are using a wireless
network which the adjudicators cannot detect?
A new kind of computer challenge, called the
“quantum Randi challenge”, was proposed in 2011
by Sascha Vongehr (Science2.0: QRC). It is inspired
by the well known challenge to “paranormal phe-
nomena” by James Randi (scientific sceptic and
fighter against pseudo-science, see Wikipedia: James
Randi). Vongehr’s challenge (see Vongehr, 2012,
2013) differs in a number of fundamental respects
from mine, which indeed was not a quantum Randi
challenge in Vongehr’s sense.
Sascha Vongehr’s QRC completely cuts out any
necessity for communication, protocol verification,
adjudication. In fact, the Bell-denier no longer has
to cooperate with myself or with any other member
of the establishment. They simply have to write a
program which should perform a certain task. They
post their program on internet. If others find that it
does indeed perform that task, the news will spread
like wildfire.
Vongehr prefers Bell’s original inequality, and I
prefer CHSH, so I will here present an (unautho-
rised) “CHSH style” modification of his QRC.
Suppose someone has invented a local hidden vari-
ables theory. He can use it to simulate N = 800 runs
of a CHSH experiment. Typically, he will simulate
the source, the photons, the detectors, all in one
program. Let us suppose that his computer code
produces reproducible results, which means that the
code or the application is reasonably portable, and
will give identical output when run on another com-
puter with the same inputs. In particular, if it makes
use of a pseudo random number generator (RNG),
it must have the usual “save” and “restore” facilities
for the seed of the RNG. Let us suppose that the pro-
gram calls the RNG the same number of times for
each run, and that the program does not make use
in any way of memory of past measurement settings.
The program must accept any legal stream of pairs
of binary measurement settings of any length N .
In particular then, the program can be run with
N = 1 and all four possible pairs of measurement
settings, and the same initial random seed, and it
will thereby generate successively four pairs (A,B),
(A′,B), (A,B′), (A′,B′). If the programmer neither
cheated nor made any errors, in other words, if the
program is a correct implementation of a genuine
LHV model, then both values of A are the same,
and so are both values of A′, both values of B, and
both values of B′. We now have the first row of the
N × 4 spreadsheet of Section 2 of this paper.
The random seed at the end of the previous phase
is now used as the initial seed for another phase, the
second run, generating a second row of the spread-
sheet. This is where the prohibition of exploiting
memory comes into force. The second row of coun-
terfactual outcomes has to be completed without
knowing which particular setting pair Alice and Bob
will actually pick for the first row.
Notice that the LHV model is allowed to use time,
since the saved random seeds could also include the
current run number and the initial random seed
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value, too: in other words, when doing the calcu-
lations for the nth run, the LHV model has access
to everything it did in the previous n− 1 runs.
My claim is that a correct implementation of a
bona-fide LHV model which does not exploit the
memory loophole can be used to fill in the N × 4
spreadsheet of Section 2. When we now generate
random settings and calculate the correlations, we
get the same results as if they had been submitted
in a single stream to the same program, run once
with the same initial seed.
My new CHSH-style QRC to any local realist
out there who is interested, is that they program
their LHV model, modified so that it simply ac-
cepts a random seed and value of N , and outputs an
N × 4 spreadsheet. They should post it on internet
and draw attention to it on any of the many in-
ternet fora devoted to discussions of quantum foun-
dations. Anyone interested runs the program, gener-
ates N×2 settings, and calculates CHSH. If the pro-
gram reproducibly, repeatedly (significantly more
than half the time, cf. Conjecture 1 of Section 2),
violates CHSH, then the creator has created a classi-
cal physical system which systematically violates the
CHSH inequalities, thereby disproving Bell’s theo-
rem. No establishment conspiracy can stop this news
from spreading round the world, everyone can repli-
cate the experiment. The creator will get the No-
bel prize and there will be incredible repercussions
throughout physics.
Some local realists will however insist on using
memory. They cannot rewrite their programs to
create one N × 4 spreadsheet. Instead, N rounds
of communication are needed between themselves
and some trusted neutral vetting agency. To bor-
row an idea I learnt from Han Geurdes, we should
think of some kind of rating agency such as those
for banks, an independent agency which carries out
“stress tests”, on demand, but at a reasonable price,
to anyone who is interested and will pay. The pro-
cedure is almost as before: it ensures yet again that
the LHV model is legitimate, or more precisely, is
legitimate in its implemented form. The agency gen-
erates a first run of settings (i.e., one setting pair),
but keeps it secret for the moment. The LHV theo-
rist supplies a first run-set of values of (A,A′,B,B′).
The agency reveals the first setting pair, the LHV
theorist generates a second run set (A,A′,B,B′).
This is repeated N = 800 times. The whole proce-
dure can be repeated any number of times, the re-
sults are published on internet, everyone can judge
for themselves.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof of (3) will use the following two Hoeffd-
ing inequalities:
Fact 3 (Binomial). Suppose X ∼ Bin(n,p) and
t > 0. Then
Pr(X/n≥ p+ t)≤ exp(−2nt2).
Fact 4 (Hypergeometric). Suppose X is the
number of red balls found in a sample without re-
placement of size n from a vase containing pM red
balls and (1− p)M blue balls and t > 0. Then
Pr(X/n≥ p+ t)≤ exp(−2nt2).
Proof of Theorem 1. In each row of our N ×
4 table of numbers ±1, the product AB equals ±1.
For each row, with probability 1/4, the product is
either observed or not observed. Let NobsAB denote the
number of rows in which both A and B are observed.
Then NobsAB ∼ Bin(N,1/4), and hence by Fact 3, for
any δ > 0,
Pr
(
NobsAB
N
≤ 1
4
− δ
)
≤ exp(−2Nδ2).
Let N+AB denote the total number of rows (i.e.,
out of N ) for which AB = +1, define N−AB simi-
larly. Let Nobs,+AB denote the number of rows such
that AB =+1 among those selected for observation
of A and B. Conditional on NobsAB = n, N
obs,+
AB is dis-
tributed as the number of red balls in a sample with-
out replacement of size n from a vase containing
N balls of which N+AB are red and N
−
AB are blue.
Therefore by Fact 4, conditional on NobsAB = n, for
any ε > 0,
Pr
(
Nobs,+AB
NobsAB
≥ N
+
AB
N
+ ε
)
≤ exp(−2nε2).
Recall that 〈AB〉 stands for the average of the
product AB over the whole table; this can be rewrit-
ten as
〈AB〉= N
+
AB −N−AB
N
= 2
N+AB
N
− 1.
Similarly, 〈AB〉obs denotes the average of the prod-
uct AB just over the rows of the table for which
both A and B are observed; this can be rewritten
as
〈AB〉obs =
Nobs,+AB −Nobs,−AB
NobsAB
= 2
Nobs,+AB
NobsAB
− 1.
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For given δ > 0 and ε > 0, all of NobsAB , N
obs
AB′ , N
obs
A′B
and NobsA′B′ are at least (
1
4 − δ)N with probability
at least 1− 4exp(−2Nδ2). On the event where this
happens, the conditional probability that 〈AB〉obs
exceeds 〈AB〉+2ε is bounded by
exp(−2NobsABε2)≤ exp(−2( 14 − δ)Nε2).
The same is true for the other three averages (for the
last one we first exchange the roles of + and − to
get a bound on 〈−A′B′〉obs). Combining everything,
we get that
〈AB〉obs+ 〈AB′〉obs+ 〈A′B〉obs−〈A′B′〉obs ≤ 2+8ε,
except possibly on an event of probability at most
p= 4exp(−2Nδ2) + 4exp(−2(14 − δ)Nε2).
We want to bound p by 8exp(−N(η/16)2) where
η = 8ε, making (η/16)2 = (ε/2)2. Choosing 8δ2 = ε2,
we find 2δ2 = (ε/2)2 = (η/16)2 . If 8(14 − δ)≥ 1, then
p≤ 8exp(−2Nδ2) and we are home. The restriction
on δ translates to δ ≤ 18 and thence to η ≤ 2
√
2.
But for η > 2, (3) is trivially true anyway, so the
restriction on η can be forgotten. 
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